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Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary
games taking place on them. While the consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by
means of organizational complexity and enhanced reciprocity that is out of reach on isolated networks, we
here address the question just how much interdependence there should be. Intuitively, one might assume
the more the better. However, we show that in fact only an intermediate density of sufficiently strong
interactions between networks warrants an optimal resolution of social dilemmas. This is due to an intricate
interplay between the heterogeneity that causes an asymmetric strategy flow because of the additional links
between the networks, and the independent formation of cooperative patterns on each individual network.
Presented results are robust to variations of the strategy updating rule, the topology of interdependent
networks, and the governing social dilemma, thus suggesting a high degree of universality.
N
etwork reciprocity is amongst the most well-known mechanisms that may sustain cooperation in evolu-
tionary games that constitute a social dilemma1. It was discovered by Nowak and May2, who observed
that on structured populations cooperators can aggregate into compact clusters and so avoid being wiped
out by defectors. Although the mechanism may not work equally well for all social dilemmas3, and recent
empirical evidence based on large-scale economic experiments indicate that it may be compromised or fail
altogether4,5, there is still ample interest in understanding how and why networks influence the evolution of
cooperation. Recent reviews are a testament to the continued liveliness of this field of research6–9.
Following the explorations of evolutionary games on individual small-world10–14, scale-free15–29, coevolving30–35,
hierarchical36 and bipartite37 networks, the attention has recently been shifting towards interdependent net-
works38–42. The latter have been put into the spotlight by Buldyrev et al.43, showing that even seemingly irrelevant
changes in one network can have catastrophic and very much unexpected consequence in another network.
Subsequently, interdependent networks have been tested for their robustness against attack and assortativity44–47,
properties of percolation48–52 and diffusion53, and they have indeed become a hot topic of general interest54,55,
touching upon subjects as diverse as epidemic spreading56, the appearance and promotion of creativity57, and
voting58.
Previous research concerning evolutionary games on interdependent networks has revealed, for example, that
biased utility functions suppress the feedback of individual success, which leads to a spontaneous separation of
characteristic time scales on the two interdependent networks38. Consequently, cooperation is promoted because
the aggressive invasion of defectors is more sensitive to the deceleration. Even if the utilities are not biased,
cooperation can still be promoted by means of interdependent network reciprocity39, which however requires
simultaneous formation of correlated cooperative clusters on both networks. It has also been shown that the
coupling of the evolutionary dynamics in each of the two networks enhances the resilience of cooperation, and
that this is intrinsically related to the non-trivial organization of cooperators across the interdependent layers40.
Perhaps most closely related to the setup of the present work is that by Wang et al.42, who showed that prob-
abilistic interconnections between interdependent networks can very much promote the evolution of coopera-
tion. In our model, however, the strategy transfer between networks is prohibited. The interdependence is thus
due solely to coupling together the payoffs of select players that reside on different networks.
Here, we wish to determine how strong the interdependence between the networks really ought to be for the
optimal promotion of cooperation. Since existing works unequivocally declare that interdependence works in
favor of the resolution of social dilemmas, onemight intuitively assume that the stronger the interdependence the
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better. As we will show, however, this assumption is not necessarily
true. To address the problem, we consider primarily the prisoner’s
dilemma game on two square lattices, where a certain fraction of
randomly selected players is allowed to connect with the correspond-
ing players in the other lattice. While strategy transfers between the
two networks are not allowed, the additional connections between
the corresponding players do influence their utility, and thus their
ability to retain and possibly spread their strategies on the home
network. This introduces two new parameters, namely the fraction
of players that is allowed to form links with the corresponding
players in the other network r, and the strength of this links a.
Together, these two parameters determine the strength of inter-
dependence, and also the success of resolving social dilemmas. For
further details with regards to the studied evolutionary games, the
applied dynamical rule, and the topology of interaction networks, we
refer to the Methods section. Independent of the strategy updating
rule, the topology of interdependent networks, and the governing
social dilemma, we will show that cooperation is promoted best if
only an intermediate fraction of players is allowed to have external
links to the other network, but also that those links should be suffi-
ciently strong. We will also reveal mechanisms that lead to the emer-
gence of the optimal interdependence.
Results
To begin with, we show in Fig. 1 the impact of parameters r and a on
the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma game. It can be observed that
there exists an intermediate range of the fraction of players that are
allowed to form an external link at which cooperators fare best.
Irrespective of the temptation to defect b, values around r < 0.5
yield an optimal outcome of the social dilemma. Yet the coupling
strength is important too. Only if the value of a is sufficiently large are
the players able to utilize the advantage of being linked to their
corresponding players in the other network. Although the level of
cooperation appears to fade slightly beyond a5 0.7 if the temptation
to defect is low or moderate [panels (a) and (b)], the prevailing
conclusion is that the coupling strength needs to be sufficiently
strong.
To clarify the mechanism that is responsible for the promotion of
cooperation, we first monitor the evolution of cooperation by mea-
suring not just the overall average cooperation level (fC), but sepa-
rately also the average cooperation level for players with (fCd ) and
without (fCo ) external links to the other network in dependence on
the number of full Monte Carlo steps (MCS), as defined in the
Methods section. For easier reference, we will refer to individuals
with external links to the other network as ‘‘distinguished’’ and to
those who have no such links as ‘‘ordinary’’ players (note that the
subscripts in fCd and fCo are chosen accordingly). Figure 2 reveals that
the cooperation level amongst the distinguished players who do have
external links to the other network is significantly higher than the
cooperation level amongst the players who are not externally linked.
Expectedly, the overall cooperation level is in-between fCd and fCo .
The identified difference between fCd and fCo is crucial, because it
indicates that players who have the ability to collect an additional
payoff from the other network are more likely to cooperate. Indeed,
the natural selection of the cooperative strategy among distinguished
players is higher than in the whole population, which is a con-
sequence of an asymmetric strategy flow that emerges between the
distinguished and other players. Because of generally higher payoffs,
the distinguished players are followed by the others, which results in
the selection of cooperation around them. In other words, distin-
guished players with an external link to the other network play the
role of leaders in the community, similarly as was reported many
times before for hubs on heterogeneous isolated (individual)
networks6.
To test this explanation further, we directly adjust the teaching
activity of players, i.e., the ability to pass their strategy to a neigh-
bor59,60, which can be done effectively by introducing amultiplication
factor w to Eq. 1. We consider two options. First, we depreciate all
distinguished players by using w 5 0.05 while keeping w 5 1 for
those who do not have an external link, and second, we reverse these
values. The expectation is that the first option will nullify the advant-
age of interdependence between the two networks, while the second
Figure 1 | Tuning in on the optimal interdependence between two square lattices for the resolution of the prisoner’s dilemma. Color coded is the
fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the fraction of players that are allowed to form an external link r and the strength of these links a, as obtained
for b5 1.03 (a), b5 1.05 (b) and b5 1.1 (c). Irrespective of b, there exists an intermediate value of r< 0.5 at which cooperation is optimally promoted.
But in addition to that, the value of a needs to be sufficiently large as well.
Figure 2 | Distinguished players who have an external link with their
corresponding player in the other network are more likely to cooperate
than those who are not externally linked. Depicted is the time evolution of
the fraction of cooperators in the whole population (fC), among the
distinguished players (fCd ), and among ordinary players, i.e., those that do
not have an external link to the other network (fCo ). It can be observed that
fCdwfCo . Parameter values used were: b 5 1.05, r 5 0.3 and a 5 0.8.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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option will further amplify the positive effects on the evolution of
cooperation.
Figure 3 reveals nicely how the leading role of distinguished
players improves the cooperation level [panels (a) and (c)], yet only
if distinguished players are not depreciated by w5 0.05 [panel (b)].
For comparison, we show in panel (a) the results obtained with the
basicmodel where all players havew5 1. There the change from a5
0 to a5 0.5 (note that for a5 0 the difference between distinguished
and ordinary players vanishes) introduces a noticeable increase in
the critical temptation to defect where cooperators die out and an
overall increase in the level of cooperation. But if w5 0.05 is applied
to distinguished players, then they become unable to lead the others
despite of the fact that their utilities are higher than those of their
neighbors. In the absence of hierarchy that was previously warranted
by the interdependence between networks, there will form no groups
with homogeneous strategies, and hence the advantage of coopera-
tionwill not be revealed. As panel (b) shows quite interestingly, a5 0
(absence of interdependence between networks) even slightly out-
performs a 5 0.5, because a weak hierarchy is then restored due to
the unequal teaching activity of players. Note that at a 5 0.5 the
unequal teaching activity is counteracted by the additional payoff
distinguished players receive from the other network. At a 5 0 this
counterbalance is lost, and the ordinary players become the leaders
due to their higher value of w. The positive effect on the level of
cooperation is, however, rather marginal.
In the opposite case, when distinguished players are endowed with
the full teaching activity w 5 1 while ordinary players without an
external link are depreciated withw5 0.05, the change from a5 0 to
a5 0.5 is the strongest [panel (c)]. Here the inequality of w and the
additional payoffs stemming from the other network are able to
strengthen each other and fortify the leaders to yield the highest
cooperation level within the framework of this model. The enforced
role of distinguished players will cause an immediate reaction from
the followers, and this prompt reactionwill select themore successful
cooperative strategy as described before. From the technical point of
view, it is interesting to note that the curves for a5 0 in Figs. 3(b) and
(c) coincide, because in the absence of extra payoff from the other
network it does notmatter whether distinguished or ordinary players
are endowed with w 5 1 (or w 5 0.05). Since the fraction of distin-
guished players was set to r 5 0.5, both fractions are equally large,
thus resulting in the same cooperation level.
Results presented in Fig. 3 and the pertaining interpretation can be
corroborated by comparing the evolution of cooperation within
different groups of players, similarly as done in Fig. 2 above. As
Fig. 4(b) shows, when the teaching activity is reduced for distin-
guished players the cooperation among them is not favored by nat-
ural selection. Consequently, only a very low value of b can ensure a
reasonably high cooperation level in the whole population because
the latter is dragged down considerably by the low fCd . There is a
slight improvement among other players, as evidenced by the higher
fCo , which is due to a higher teaching activity. However, despite their
higher teaching activity, ordinary players cannot lead the whole
population efficiently because distinguished players are reluctant to
follow them due to their higher individual utility. If either the teach-
ing activity of all players is left intact [panel (a)] or the higher teach-
ing activity is awarded to distinguished players [panel (c)], then
fCovfCd , as observed initially in Fig. 2. Thus, the basic mechanism
of cooperation promotion is restored or even additional fortified.
Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the optimal inter-
dependence between the networks can work in favor of cooperation
only if there are distinguished players in both graphs. On the other
hand, if the additional utilities flow only in one direction, the mech-
anism will fail or yield only a marginally better outcome. Results
supporting this argumentation are presented in Fig. 5. For reference,
the outcome on an isolated network is depicted as well. It can be
observed that if distinguished players in the first network can collect
additional payoffs from the second network, but the evolution in the
second network is independent from the first network because
players there are unable to collect additional payoffs (the inter-
dependence is unilateral), then the critical temptation to defect b at
which cooperators die out does not increase at all. In fact, only the
level of cooperation increases slightly in the mixed C 1 D phase. If
the interdependence is bilateral, i.e., players on both networks can
collect an additional payoff from the other network, however, the
positive impact on the evolution of cooperation is much stronger.
This highlights the importance of mutual interdependence and the
independent formation of cooperative patterns on each individual
network. Players connected to their corresponding partners in the
other network can support each other effectively only if homogenous
cooperative domains emerge on both networks. Notably, the import-
ance of correlated growth and formation of cooperative domains has
been emphasized already in39, although here they need not overlap
geographically. We could observe practically the same cooperation
level when distinguished players collected additional payoffs from an
ordinary player in the other network. Namely, there is no need to link
distinguished players from different networks with one another. The
Figure 3 | Interdependence between networks favors cooperation only if the awarded additional payoffs are not counteracted by reduced teaching
activity. Panel (a) depicts the fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the temptation to defect b for the basic version of the game, where all players
have teaching activityw5 1. In panel (b) the teaching activity of all distinguished players who have an external link to the other network is reduced tow5
0.05. It can be observed that the promotion of cooperation due to the interdependence vanishes. In panel (c) the teaching activity of all ordinary players is
reduced to w 5 0.05, which further strengthens the leading role of the distinguished players and leads to the strongest promotion of cooperation. All
panels feature results for a5 0 and a5 0.5 at r5 0.5, where a5 0 means that effectively the two networks are isolated, i.e., there is no interdependence
because the links between the two networks yield no additional utility to either player.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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crucial condition is the chance of heterogeneity on both networks61,
the positive effect of which can then be mutually amplified through
the interdependence.
Our argument for the spreading of cooperative behavior among
distinguished players can also be supported by how the border of the
fullD phase behaves in dependence of r and a at a high temptation to
defect. As results presented in Fig. 1(c) suggest, a smaller density of
distinguished players can be compensated by a higher value of a, but
only up to a certain point. At such a high temptation value coopera-
tors cannot survive even for large values of a if the density of dis-
tinguished players r is below a threshold value. Naturally, the critical
r depends slightly on the temptation to defect [compare panels (b)
and (c)], but the smallest value of the phase transition point is close to
the critical rc 5 0.1869(1) value of jamming coverage of particles
during a random sequential adsorption when nearest and next near-
est neighbor interactions are excluded on a square lattice62. Shortly, if
distinguished players are too rare, then to support them via a high a
will not yield the desired impact because their influence cannot per-
colate. The latter, however, is an essential condition to maintain
cooperation, which was already pointed out in previous works63,64.
It is lastly of interest to verify the robustness of these observations,
first with regards to the strategy updating rule. As results presented in
Fig. 6 demonstrate, our conclusions are not restricted solely to the
Fermi-type strategy updating6,65, but remain valid also under the
best-takes-over rule2 and proportional imitation66. In both cases an
optimal intermediate value of r is clearly inferable, and the positive
effect on the evolution of cooperation is the stronger the larger the
value of the coupling strength a. This is qualitatively identical as
observed in Fig. 1 with the Fermi rule.
Since previous works revealed that the clustering coefficient could
be a decisive factor affecting the evolution of cooperation in games
that are governed by pairwise interactions67,68 (note that this is not the
case for games governed by group interactions69), it is also instructive
to examine the relevance of network interdependence under this
condition. Unlike the square lattice that has a zero clustering coef-
ficient, the triangular lattice has a high clustering coefficient, and
thus serves the purpose very well. Results presented in Fig. 7(a) attest
to the fact that the existence of optimal network interdependence
does not depend on structural properties of each individual network,
as indeed the a –r dependence of fC is the same as observed before for
Figure 4 | Decreasing the teaching activity of distinguished players nullifies their higher propensity to cooperate, and it reduces the temptation to
defect that still warrants a healthy cooperation level in the whole population. Depicted is the time evolution of the fraction of cooperators in the whole
population (fC), among the distinguished players (fCd ), and among ordinary players (fCo ). It can be observed that fCdwfCo in panels (a) and (c), but not in
panel (b). In the latter, the teaching activity of all distinguished players who have an external link to the other network is reduced tow5 0.05. In panel (a)
all players havew5 1, while in panel (c) the teaching activity of all ordinary players is reduced tow5 0.05, which further amplifies the fCdwfCo difference.
We have used parameter values that yield approximately the same overall level of cooperation (fC) in all three cases: r5 0.3, b5 1.05 and a5 0.8 for panel
(a), r 5 0.3, b 5 1.0 and a 5 0.25 for panel (b), and r 5 0.3, b 5 1.09 and a 5 0.25 for panel (c).
Figure 5 | Optimal interdependence between the two networks works
optimally only if the links connecting them go both ways. Depicted is the
fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the temptation to defect b as
obtained on an isolated network (reference case), on two networks
connected by means of unidirectional links, and on two mutually
interdependent networks. Cooperation is optimally promoted only if there
is independent formation of cooperative patterns on each individual
network, for which the chance for heterogeneity (distinguished players)
needs to be provided on both of them. Parameter values used were: r5 0.5
and a 5 0.5.
Figure 6 | Robustness of optimal network interdependence on different
strategy updating rules. Color coded is the fraction of cooperators fC in
dependence on the fraction of players that are allowed to form an external
link r and the strength of these links a, as obtained for b 5 1.4 and best-
takes-over strategy updating (a), and b5 1.06 and proportional imitation
(b). Irrespective of the applied strategy updating rule, there exists an
intermediate value of r at which cooperation is optimally promoted, and
the dependence on a is also qualitatively the same as in Fig. 1, where the
Fermi strategy adoption rule has been used.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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the square lattice in Fig. 1. To conclude, we extend our exploration
also to other social dilemmas,more precisely the snowdrift game, and
as shown in Fig. 7(b), the main conclusions remain intact. To reit-
erate, the exists and intermediate level of interdependence between
networks that is optimal for the resolution of social dilemmas.
Discussion
Summarizing, we have studied the evolution of cooperation in the
spatial prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game subject to inter-
connectedness by means of a different fraction of differently strong
links between the corresponding players residing on the two inter-
dependent networks. We have found that for cooperation to be
optimally promoted, the interdependence should stem only from
an intermediate fraction of links connecting the two networks, and
that those links should affect the utility of players significantly. The
existence of optimal interdependence has been attributed to the het-
erogeneity that is brought about by the enhanced utility of those
players that do have external links to the other network, as opposed
to those who have not. This introduces asymmetric strategy flow,
which in turn leads to the emergence of influential leaders that can
act as strong cooperative hubs in their respective networks.
Importantly, the compact cooperative patterns that appear indepen-
dently on both networks support each other mutually through the
links that constitute the interdependence. Indeed, we have shown
that the mechanism works best only if the interdependence is bilat-
eral, and if the asymmetric strategy flow is not counteracted by
artificial low weights assigned to the reproducibility of intercon-
nected players. In case of unidirectional interdependence or if the
reproducibility of players is altered, however, somemarginal benefits
for cooperators may still exist, but these are then far removed from
the full potential of interdependent networks to aid the resolution of
social dilemmas. We have tested the robustness of these conclusions
by replacing the Fermi strategy adoption rule with the best-takes-
over and the proportional imitation rule, as well as by replacing the
square lattice having zero clustering coefficient with the triangle
lattice that has a much higher clustering coefficient, as well as finally
by replacing the prisoner’s dilemma game with the snowdrift game.
Quite remarkably, we have found that the optimal interdependence
persist across all these different setups, thus leading to the conclusion
that it ought to be to a large degree a universally valid phenomenon.
While the games on interdependent networks studied here are not
meant to model a particular real-life situation, they nevertheless do
capture the essence of some situations that are viable in reality. For
example, it is generally accepted that not all individuals are equally
fond of making connections outside of their natural environment.
Similarly, some would very much wish to do so, but may not have a
chance. These and similar considerations may all affect the level of
interdependence between two or more networks, and it is within the
realm of these possibilities that our study predicts the existence of an
optimal level of interconnectedness. Future studies could address the
coupling of more complex (small world or scale-free, for example)
interaction topologies, the outcome of other games on interdepend-
ent networks, such as for example the traveler’s dilemma game that
has recently been studied in a spatial setting70, as well as the impact of
coevolution and growth, both of which have recently been the subject
of much interest71–75. Overall, it seems safe to conclude that the
interdependence of interaction networks offers several exciting pos-
sibilities for further research related to evolutionary games, and it
ought to bring the models a step closer to actual conditions, given
that networks indeed rarely exist in an isolated state.
Methods
The evolutionary game is staged on two square lattices, each of size L 3 L, where
initially each player x is designated either as a cooperator (sx5C) or defector (sx5D)
with equal probability. Likewise randomly, a fraction r of players on each lattice is
selected and allowed to form an external link with a corresponding player in the other
lattice. Although we predominantly use the square lattice, we will also resort to using
the triangle lattice, given that the difference in the clustering coefficient has been
determined as a potentially key factor for the outcome of games that are governed by
pairwise interactions67,68.
The accumulation of payoffs px on both networks follows the same standard
procedure, depending on the type of the governing social dilemma. In both games two
cooperators facing one another acquire R, two defectors get P, whereas a cooperator
receives S if facing a defector who then gains T. The prisoner’s dilemma game is
characterized by the temptation to defectT5 b, reward formutual cooperationR5 1,
and punishment P as well as the sucker’s payoff S equaling 0, whereby 1 , b # 2
ensures a proper payoff ranking2. We note that qualitatively similar results are
obtained also for other values of S. The snowdrift game, on the other hand, has T5 b,
R5 b2 1/2, S5 b2 1 and P5 0, where the temptation to defect can be expressed in
terms of the cost-to-benefit ratio r 5 1/(2b 2 1) with 0 # r # 1. Due to the
interdependence (external links between corresponding players), however, the util-
ities used to determine fitness are not simply payoffs obtained from the interactions
with the nearest neighbors on each individual network, but ratherUx5 px1 apx9 for
players that have an external link, and Ux5 px otherwise. The parameter 0# a# 1
determines the strength of external links, i.e., the larger its value the higher the
potential increase of utility of two players that are connected by the external link.
Importantly, while the interdependence affects the utility of players, it does not
allow strategies to be transferred between the two networks. Thus, the evolution of the
two strategies proceeds in accordance with the standard Monte Carlo simulation
procedure comprising the following elementary steps for each network. First, a ran-
domly selected player x acquires its utility Ux by playing the game with all its nearest
neighbors and taking into account also the potential addition to the utility stemming
from the possible external link, as described above. Next, one randomly chosen
neighbor of xwithin the same network, denoted by y, also acquires its utilityUy in the
same way. Lastly, player x attempts to adopt the strategy sy from player y with a
probability determined by the Fermi function
W sy?sx
 
~
1
1zexp Ux{Uy
 
K
  , ð1Þ
where K5 0.1 quantifies the uncertainty related to the strategy adoption process6,65.
The latter is usually associated with errors in decision making and imperfect
information transfer between the players. Notably, to test the robustness of our
findings, we will also use the best-takes-over2 and the proportional imitation66
strategy updating rule. Regardless of which type of interaction network, evolutionary
game, or the strategy updating rule is used, in accordance with the random asyn-
chronous update, each player on both networks is selected once on average during a
full Monte Carlo step. Moreover, sufficiently large system sizes (from L5 200 to L5
800) and relaxation times need to be used to avoid finite size effects and to ensure a
stationary state has been reached. Presented results were averaged over up to 30
independent runs to further improve accuracy.
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